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One class of theories explains group induced shifts in individual 
choice in terms of interpersonal comparison process. By comparing 
himself with others a member finds out that his position is uncom- 
fortably discrepant, e.g., he is overly “cautious” or overly “risky.” 
Knowledge of this discrepancy presumably is necessary and suf- 
ficient to induce him to change his initial choice. Another class 
of theories holds that merely knowing one is different from others 
is unimportant. Shifts in choice occur because during discussion a 
member is exposed to persuasive arguments which prior to dis- 
cussion were not available to him. Thus, if in a factorial design 
one independently varied (a) the number of others’ choices avail- 
able for comparison and (b) the number of arguments others 
presented in support of these choices, interpersonal comparison 
theories would predict the magnitude of the shift to be a function 
of (a) and not of (b), while theories of persuasive argumenta- 
tion would predict the opposite. When such an experiment was 
performed the only reliable main effects were based on the num- 
ber of arguments, (b), as predicted by persuasive arguments. In 
no instance did effects involving (a) approach significance. 
The present study is concerned with certain celebrated revisions of 
preference following group discussion. Such changes have been labeled 
“risky” (or “cautious”) shifts when group members discussed the choice 
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of a probability level, e.g., what is the minimum probability of success 
one should demand in order to select an uncertain but potentially attrac- 
tive course of action (see the reviews by Cartwright, 1971; Pruitt, 
1971a,b; Vinokur, 1971a). When members discussed some social issue, 
e.g., was DeGaulle a great leader, the change which resulted was called 
“polarization” or “extremization” of opinions (Doise, 1969; Gouge & 
Fraser. 1972; Moscovici & Zavelloni, 1969; Myers & Bishop, 1970, 1971). 
In attempting to explain these effects some theorists concluded that group 
discussion was unimportant. The necessary and sufficient condition for 
producing a shift in choice was that a member recognize his OWII initial 
position differed (in a specified direction) from the positions of others. 
Their explanations, therefore, rely on interpersonal comparisons. Other 
theorists assumed exposure to or participation in discussion was of critical 
importance. They stressed persuasive argumentation and, to some extent, 
differcmtial influence or leadership based on such argumentation. Thcst, 
two classes of theories make quite different predictions, some of which 
are discussed below. 
The importance of persuasive argumentation in group decision makillq 
\vas lloted many years ago by Thorndike ( 1938a,b). It has been various11 
used to analyze group-induced shifts in choice by Nordhpry ( 1968 i, 
St. Jean ( 1970), Stoner ( 1968), Teger and Pruitt ( 1967). Vinokur 
( 1971a.b ). and Vinokur and Burnstein ( 1972). The \‘inokur version as- 
SIIIII~S that a particular decision elicits a set of standard arguments in 
support of the various alternatives among which the person must choose. 
Presumably the arguments reflect certain cultural values engaged by th(, 
decision. A persuusice argument is thought to be similar in effect to that 
of a correct solution in group problem solving: once made, it is ver)- 
likely to be accepted either because it is intrinsically cogent, the membcI 
who proposes the argument is highly confident of its merits, or both. 
The number of arguments available to the nveragc member (or the 
probability of a particular argument) will vary as a function of the isslles 
raised by the decision. Thus, faced with a particular choice, a very 1arKe. 
a moclrrate, or an extremely small number of arguments may come to 
mind. The extent of the shift in choice a group will induce depends 011 
the likelihood that the average member will have available all or most 
of the persuasive arguments, If the likelihood is very great, then irldivitl- 
uals will have already made their initial choice on the basis of all or most 
of the persuasive arguments. Therefore, not only will they have confi- 
dently taken a relatively extreme position beforehand. but they also are 
unlikely to encounter new persuasive ideas in discussion, ones which had 
not been considered in making their initial choice. If tlrc likelihood is 
\-(‘I-\. small. very few individuals will bcs able to muster strong support 
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for their position during discussion, and thus hardly anyone will have a 
good reason for changing their choice. It follows that the largest shifts 
will be induced by group discussion when persuasive arguments have a 
muchute likelihood of being available to the average member. 
Among the interpersonal comparison theories, Brown ( RX%), Levinger 
and Schneider ( EMQ), and Jellison and Riskind ( 1970) assume that an 
individual contrasts his choice with the average choice of other members; 
and they predict, for somewhat different reasons, that relatively mod- 
erate choices will be changed so as to be equal to or more extreme than 
this average. Pruitt (1971a) believes the comparison is made with the 
most extreme member, to the same effect. The incentive for shifting also 
varies somewhat from theory to theory. For Brown, the member’s choice 
reflects his adherence to cherished social values; a moderate member 
will change because he wants to demonstrate at least as much adherence 
as the others. Jellison and Riskind define the choice (of a “risk” level) 
as an assertion of ability; because according to social comparison theory, 
the person wishes to appear slightly more able than others, a shift in 
choice will be made by the relatively moderate members. Finally, 
Levinger and Schneider, as well as Pruitt, think the moderate member 
really wants to take an extreme position but initially suppresses this 
yearning; the observation that others have made extreme choices legiti- 
mizes the desire and allows the member to shift with impunity. 
One implication of interpersonal comparison theories is that no shift 
in choice will occur if members remain ignorant of each other’s real 
preferences; typical shifts will occur, however, when such knowledge 
becomes available, independent of discussion. Persuasive-argument 
theory leads one to expect almost the opposite. 
Past work on the relative significance of knowledge of other’s posi- 
tion and of group discussion had members either discuss without re- 
vealing their own choice or reveal their choice without discussing. With 
the latter paradigm some researchers have observed rather weak shifts 
(Clark & Willems, 1969; Teger & Pruitt, 1967), while most have found 
no shifts at all (Clark et al., 1971; St. ‘Jean, 1970; Wallach & Kogan, 
1965). The former procedure produced sizable shifts (Clark et cd., 1971; 
St. Jean, 1970). However, reasonably accurate inferences probably could 
be made about where another member actually stood from what he said 
in discussion even without his making an explicit statement to that effect. 
A recent experiment focusing on these issues obtained results which 
support the predictions made by persuasive-argument theory and not 
those made by theories of interpersonal comparison (Burnstein & 
Vinokur, in press). For instance, it was found that if a member did not 
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know whether others were arguing for their own position or were being 
forced to support a position contrary to the one they had initially chosen, 
and the former in fact was the case, typical shifts in choice were ob- 
tained: however, if a member had to argue for a position contrary to his 
own (and thus he would not be able to muster highly persuasive argu- 
ments) typical shifts did not occur, even though another’s actual choice 
could be accurately inferred from the position he was required to support 
in discussion. 
There is, however. a more straightforward difference between these 
two sets of theories which has not yet been examined empirically. III 
ptinciple, it is a difference which should not be difficult to test by means 
of a simple factorial design, to wit: one systematically varies the amount 
of information the subject possesses about others’ choices or the positions 
they have taken independent of the amount of argumentation to which 
he is exposed in support of these positions. At the very least, interper- 
sonal comparison must predict that considerably more of choice-shift 
variance will be explained by differences ill information about others‘ 
choices than by differences in amount of persuasive argumentation. 
Theories based on persuasive argumentation, of course, would predict 
the opposite. More precisely, in the context of an analysis of variauce 
model. the former theories lead one to expect a main effect based on the 
amount of information about others’ positions or choice, and no main 
effect for number of arguments; the latter theories demand a main effect 
for number of arguments and no main effect for number of choices. 
This rather simple design, however, poses some technical problems. 
Although there are a good number of ways to control the amount of 
information available about others’ choices (e.g., SW Burnstcitt CL 
\7itlokur. in press) the problem of controlling the number of arguments 
to which an individual is exposed is not so readily solved. For esamplc~, 
having subjects discuss their choice for different Iengths of timcb is XII 
obvious method for limiting the amount of argumentation. Yet this 
woltld provide only the very crudest control over the actual number of 
arguments presented during a givrn interval. NevertheIess, it has l)ee~r 
known for some time that merely exposing a subject to a tape recording 
of group discussion is sufficient to induce a shift in choice (Kogan & 
Wallach, 1967; Lamm, 1967). In fact, such findings have hrcn taken 
as strong evidence for persuasive-arguments theory. Following up this 
line of research, Vinokur and Burnstein (1972) collected a large number 
of individual arguments subjects gave to support altrrnative course’s of 
action in the several decision tasks which are standard in this arcn. Tltr! 
then presented a small but representatilre sanqde of thcsc arguments in 
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written form to individuals and found typical, though somewhat at- 
tenuated, shifts in choice. Thus, it seems feasible to use this pool of argu- 
ments for the purposes of the present study. That is to say, by adminis- 
tering different-sized samples of arguments from our pool we can 
systematically vary the amount of argumentation to which a subject is 
exposed. Moreover, by associating an explicit choice with one or more 
of the arguments we can at the same time vary the number of others’ 
choices known to the subject. It should then be possible to determine 
which, if either, of the two sets of theories is correct-do shifts in 
choice vary directly with the knowledge a person possesses about others’ 
choices and not with the amount of argumentation presented in support 
of these choices or vice versa? 
METHOD 
Subjects 
A total of two hundred fifty-six male and female students from the introductory 
courses in psychology at The University of Michigan participated as subjects in this 
experiment. Participation fulfilled a course requirement. They were run in groups of 
three to seven subjects. On the average an experimental session lasted for little less 
than an hour. 
Materials and Experimental Conditions 
A set of four Choice Dilemma Questionnaire (CDQ) items were chosen so as to 
include two “risky” items (i.e., items that have been found to yield reliable “risky” 
shifts), and two “cautious” items (i.e., items that have been found to yield reliable 
“cautious” shifts). The two risky items were taken from the original CDQ (numbers 
4 and 6 in Kogan and Wallach, 1964, Appendix E). The two cautious items were 
taken from a questionnaire used by Stoner ( 1968, numbers 2 and 8). These four 
items were also used by Vinokur (1971b) in a set of experiments that replicated 
the usual findings on these items. 
Each choice-dilemma was accompanied by the standard instructions to choose- 
between odds of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 9 chances in IO--the lowest odds of success 
acceptable in order to recommend trying the uncertain (i.e., risky) alternative; or, 
instead. to indicate that this alternative should not be attempted. no matter what the 
odds. In the latter case, a response is usually scored as 10. A choice is measured as 
the odds that are chosen by the subject. The four items were preceded by the stan- 
dard instructions and assembled in a questionnaire entitled “Opinion Questionnaire.” 
In addition to the Opinion Questionnaire, each subject was given a booklet which 
contained choices (in terms of 1, 2, . . . , or 10 chances in IO) made by other sub- 
jects as well as the best arguments they produced in support of their positions. Each 
booklet contained four sees of materials relevant to the four items described above. 
Depending on the experimental condition, each set consisted of either one or five 
positions taken by others and five or twenty-five arguments. The number of positions 
for the two levels of the first factor (one and five positions) were chosen to corre- 
spond to the minimum number of positions possible (one) and to the most common 
number of positions or group size for this area of research (five). Correspondingly, 
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the mm~ber of arguments for the two levels of the second factor were chosen to in- 
clude a minimum of one argument per position for the lowest level (a minimum of 
five arglm~ents to match five positions) and the average number of arguments pro- 
duced by a group of five subjects (twenty-five arguments). The latter value was 
determined in an earlier analysis of arguments generated in response to CDQ item? 
( Vinokur & Burnstein, 1972 ) . 
The arguments belonging to a particular position were placed next to it. Thus, 
four sets of booklets were used in this experiment. Each set defined an experimental 
condition as follows: Condition I contained one position accompanied by five al-g”- 
merits: Condition II, one position accompanied by twenty-five arguments; Condition 
III, fi\-e positions, each accompanied by one argument: and Condition IV, five posi- 
tions, each accompanied by five arguments. 
The positions and the arguments were matched in a particular way. The positions 
appearing in each set were a random sample of the initial positions of subjects ob- 
tained from the data of Vinokur’s (1971b) experiment. The arguments were ran- 
domly selected from the large pool of pro-risk and pro-caution arguments collected 
by Vinokur and Burnstein ( 1972). The main constraint was that arguments selected 
to go along \vith a specific position had, on the whole, to he consistent with the latter. 
Thus, in booklets used in Conditions I, II, and IV, each risky position (above the 
mean “riskiness” for that item) was accompanied by a majority of pro-risk argu- 
ments and a minority of pro-caution items. The size of the majority increased \vith 
the extremity of the position. For example, in Condition I (one position and five 
arguments) for item 4, a “risky” CDQ item used in the present strldy, a position 
of 1 in 10 would be accompanied by 5 or 4 pro-risk arguments; a position of -1 in 
10 \vould be accompanied by 3 pro-risk arguments and 2 pro-caution arguments. 
The opposite was true for cautious choices, a position of 9 in 10, 8 in 10, etc. In the 
booklets used in Condition III each position was accompanied by one argument. 1, 
“risky” position was assigned a pro-risk argument and a “cautious” position \\XS 
assignrtl a pro-caution argument. 
Suhiects arriving at the laboratory were seated at small tables. Each received a 
cpwstionnaire containing the standard instructions for responding to choice-dilemnln 
items, a practice item, and the four items described above. After the questionnaire\ 
were completed they were collected. Then, depending on the experimental situation. 
subjects received the booklets with arguments and positions described above and a 
new copy of the Opinion Questionnaire with the four items. They \vrre then asked 
to read the instructions attached to the booklet. These instructions were identical 
for all the four conditions. The last part of these instructions, \vhich serve as a final 
::nmmar);, read as followvs’: 
“Al’ain, the arguments and the choices they accompany were made hy brll,jects 
I’k 1 e yourself and reflect their opinions concerning the choice dilemnra situations. Sornc 
of these arguments and choices may be valid and sound whereas others may not. It 
partly depends on the kind of assumptions and inferences that you consider rcason- 
able in light of the information available in the choice-dilemma sitllation. Further- 
more. >ou may find that some arguments raise new points or illuminate new aspects 
of the problem that you have not thought about before and have not taken into con- 
sideration. It is entirely up to you to determine the soundness and nsefulnrss of till* 
’ Tlrr compl&e set of instructions can be obtained from the anthrm. 
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arguments and the choices they accompany and, accordingly, how to utilize them. 
What we want is that you carefully examine the arguments and the choices so that 
you make the best possible decision on the probability scale. 
Please do not feel bound by what you marked before. What is important is that 
you consider the problems, the arguments, and the choices carefully and seriously 
and check what you consider the best decision now.” 
After subjects completed their work on the second questionnaire, the nature and 
purpose of the experiment was expIained at length. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
An analysis of variance was performed on shift scores, that is, on the 
difference between a subject’s choice before and after he learned what 
position others have taken and what arguments they made to support 
their position. The direction of the shift for a particular CDQ type item 
is remarkably reliable. Since the magnitude of the shift in choice was at 
issue and not the direction, shift scores for all four items were combined, 
irrespective of their direction. A summary of the analysis is shown in 
Table 1. The only reliable main effect is based on number of arguments. 
The items were then broken into those which shift toward “risk” and 
those which shift toward “caution.” Separate analyses of each set reveal 
main effects for number of arguments. In no instance do effects based 
on the number of others’ choices (positions) approach acceptable levels 
of statistical significance. A summary of these analyses is given in Table 2. 
Mean shifts in choice are presented in Table 3. On the whole the results 
strongly support persuasive argument theories. Along with the findings 
from our earlier study (Burnstein and Vinokur, in press), they imply 
TABLE 1 
SUMMARY OF THK ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF SHIFTS IN INDIVIDUAL CHOICE 













1 10.27 6.69* 
1 3.87 2.52 
1 0.90 <l 
252 1.53 
1 1.17 <I 
1 0.004 <1 
1 0.67 <I 
1 2.60 1.77 
252 1.46 
* p < 0.05. 
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TABLE 2 
SUMMARV OF THE Analyses OF VARIAN~I~: 01‘ SHIFTS IN (1H0K'li FOR 
“RISKY" ITE:MS AND FOR "C \lWIOCS" ITI':MS 
* p < o.oli. 
that at best interpersonal comparison processes are relatizje2!/ unim- 
portant for understanding the choice-shift phenomenon4 
Nevertheless, interpersonal comparison processes still cannot be dis- 
missed as completely irrelevant. An examination of the mean shifts in 
TabIe 3 indicates a comparatively modest yet noticeabIe shift in choice 






06 .a*** - I .5 - :;7** - (r’2 t!l** 
:32*** ,52*** - .:;::* - ,;7*** ::0 ::7* 
~1 For t,he risky and cautious items negai.ive vallleh (lesiplla\e “risky” shift- at111 pohi- 
t,ive values designate “cautious” shifts. For all iirnw (xmbinrtl lhe v:illle~ i~ttlicxtt: i Iw 
overall magnitude of t,he shift of t.he direciion. 
* p < 0.05. 
** p < 0.01. 
*** p < 0.001. 
’ The magnitudes of the shifts produced by 25 arguments are similar to those trb- 
tained in Vinokur and Burnstein (1972) ~1 u lere an identical nmllber of argument\ 
were selected at random from a larger pool. This suggests that in spite of the con- 
straints placed on the selection of arguments in the present study, they prohal& 
were not unrepresentative. 
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(the five arguments-five positions cells). At present one can only con- 
jecture about the persistence of weak interpersonal comparison effects, 
and because these effects were so weak we do not intend to conjecture 
at length: It may well be the case that when a person reconsiders an 
initial choice his first preference is to do this in the light of information 
contained in the arguments-if for no other reason than these statements 
provide better or more information for evaluating alternatives than the 
mere choices of others. However, when only the latter are available, they 
will be put to use. But perhaps not as interpersonal comparison theorists 
imagine. Thus, knowledge that others’ choices are discrepant from his 
own may induce the person to reconstruct a line of reasoning which he 
thinks could have produced such choices. That is to say, knowing others 
have chosen differently stimulates the person to generate arguments 
which could explain (and thus would support) their choices. Therefore, 
according to our conjecture, informing the person that others took a 
position more extreme than his own does not serve so much to threaten 
his self-esteem or to legitimize some suppressed yearning but rather in- 
duces him to find a reasonable explanation for the difference. 
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